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Abstract
In April 1998, the Australian Taxation Office (Tax Office) adopted a policy of responsive
regulation of tax compliance by small firms in the building and construction industry. Known
as the Australian Taxation Office Compliance Model (ATO Compliance Model), the new
approach is grounded in past research into regulation of business entities. As seen by its
promoters, it promises to improve significantly tax compliance in the cash economy. Drawing
from survey and interview data, we explore the Tax Office’s capacity for successful
implementation of the ATO Compliance Model. Specifically, we examine the extent to which
it had the leadership and staff commitment to implement the policy successfully. We also
explore whether or not project field-level staff saw merit in the program and eventually came
to support it. We conclude by examining whether the owners of small building and
construction firms changed their perspectives on the Tax Office and tax compliance following
introduction of the ATO Compliance Model.
1Organisational capacity for responsive regulation
Neal Shover, Jenny Job and Anne Carroll
In July 1997 the Australian Taxation Office (Tax Office) launched a series of initiatives
aimed at the cash economy. The cash economy is understood as income that is not recorded
in the books from which the tax return is prepared (Cash Economy Task Force, 1998, p. 15).
The Tax Office initiatives targeted cash economy transactions by small firms in several
industries. Several months later, they were augmented by a Tax Office decision to adopt a
new approach to tax enforcement and to try it out in the small building and construction
industry. This program of responsive regulation, known as the Australian Taxation Office
Compliance Model (ATO Compliance Model), reflects considerable research into regulatory
processes and is touted as a more effective approach to tax enforcement. It has since been
extended to all of the Tax Office’s operations.
At inception, this research was intended as a retrospective process analysis of
implementation of the ATO Compliance Model for the small building and construction
industry, and an examination of some of its short-term impacts. Process analysis is used in
evaluation research as a way of understanding how reforms are implemented and brought to
bear in the day-to-day work routines of managers and employees (Weiss, 1998). It can lay
bare how organisational realities and dynamics constrain reforms adopted in other
circumstances for reasons often unknown to or unappreciated by those charged with
implementing them. Typically, process analysis uses interviews and observation as a way of
interpreting the statistically observable consequences of a new program.
Twenty months after its inauguration, the impending arrival of the goods and services tax
(GST) caused a substantial reduction in personnel and resources committed to the Cash
Economy Building and Construction Project (CE/B&C project). This also caused us to scale
back our original research plans and shift our focus somewhat to examining the Tax Office’s
capacity to effectively implement the ATO Compliance Model.
2This paper begins with a brief description of the genesis of the ATO Compliance Model and
its adoption by the Tax Office. This is followed by a description of the underlying
assumptions and objectives of the present study, and the methods it used. Our focus is
organisational capacity. This is defined as the extent to which an organisation possesses the
mandate, requisite resources, determination and facilitative environmental conditions to
implement reform policies, with fidelity to the goals envisioned by reformers. The research
findings are then presented, drawing heavily from analysis of the perspectives and
experiences of field-level personnel.
The paper concludes with analysis and discussion of data gathered from interviews with
owners of small building and construction firms.
Background
The closing decades of the twentieth century saw significant policy developments in the
movement to enhance business compliance with regulatory rules (Parker, 2000). Previously,
the ‘command-and-control’ approach dominated discussions of and proposals for enhanced
regulation. This approach incorporates legal threats, inspections and the mechanical
imposition of penalties for non-compliance. A variety of evidence suggests, however, that the
adversarial nature of command-and-control regulation fosters resentment, mistrust and
resistance, at least in some industries or industry sectors. Persistent doubts about its benefits
and effectiveness eventually led to programs of enforced self-regulation and cooperative
regulation. These are distinguished both by shared state–corporate responsibility for
enforcement and by a wider range of official options for responding to non-compliance.
Proposals for and programs of enforced self-regulation also came under fire by critics who
question whether they can deliver fairer or more effective outcomes.
This controversy led Ayres and Braithwaite (1992) to propose a convergence of the two
approaches, known as ‘responsive regulation’. Responsive regulation is grounded in a
hierarchical development and application of enforcement strategies that take into account the
circumstances and capabilities of differing business entities. It is ‘distinguished.….both in
what triggers a regulatory response and what the regulatory response will be’ (Ayres &
Braithwaite, 1992, p. 4).
3Conceptually, Ayres and Braithwaite (1992) present their notion of responsive regulation in
the form of a ‘regulatory pyramid’, which is depicted graphically in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Regulatory pyramid.
The base of the pyramid is made up of broad cooperative strategies of self-regulation that
emphasise education about rules and provide assistance with complying. For citizens and
businesses that fail to comply despite educative and cooperative actions, officials may
escalate their responses and sanctions. The top of the sanctions pyramid is represented by a
‘benign big gun’. Ordinarily kept in the background, it represents the most severe sanctions
in the arsenal of regulatory officials. The availability of the benign big gun, coupled with
officials’ clear willingness to employ it, serves to push enforcement down towards the base
for those who fail to respond to assistance, or to punish those who commit an offence beyond
deterrence or refuse to cooperate. This approach to regulation nurtures voluntary compliance
while displaying a willingness to employ escalating sanctions should the need arise.
Ayres and Braithwaite (1992, p. 4) suggest that officials ‘be responsive to industry structure
in that different structures will be conducive to different degrees and forms of regulation’.
More specifically, effective responsive regulation requires that officials understand and take
account of the diverse motivational sources (‘drivers’) of non-compliance. These are not well
understood at present, but the ATO Compliance Model incorporates the results of previous
4research that points to four common motivational postures (Braithwaite, 1995). The results
also define the nature of the regulator–client relationship: managerial accommodation
(incorporation of the firm’s own strategies to achieve compliance); capture (acceptance and
identity with the regulatory system); resistance (confrontation and challenge of regulations);
and disengagement (withdrawal from the regulatory process).
Advocates for responsive regulation contend that motivations for non-compliance are not
fixed and immutable, but are subject to shift within the dynamics of the regulatory process.
Movement in the direction of compliance may be accomplished by engaging the owners or
managers of firms in a common regulatory culture with strong social bonds and a shared
mission. This assumes that failure to comply may not result only from wilfulness but also
from ignorance of what is required, from inadvertent errors in tax records, or from changes in
taxpayers’ circumstances. In such cases they are not necessarily resistant or disengaged from
the tax system. Understanding both the diverse motivational sources of non-compliance and
the need for mutual respect and trust in contacts with firms is central to improving
compliance. Thus, firms whose owners or managers are inclined to comply with the law may
be strengthened in this posture by officials who treat them as trustworthy, if confused or
misguided citizens, while those of a more resistive bent may be nudged towards compliance
through the judicious use of educative efforts laced with a dose of threat. The more
recalcitrant are another matter, for they may need to be reminded of, or even to experience
first-hand, criminal prosecution or loss of their licence to do business.
Notions of responsive regulation grew out of a substantial body of empirical research into the
regulatory process. Whilst they have considerable intuitive appeal, particularly when applied
to the dynamics of interpersonal relations, as yet they have been subjected to limited testing.
The consequences of responsive regulation, when entrusted to the potential distorting
influences caused by bureaucratic considerations and dynamics, remain unclear. Responsive
regulation, moreover, may work well in some circumstances but not nearly so well in others;
policies that are effective with small firms may have quite different effects when employed
with large, heavily resourced entities and industries. Thus the need, as recognised by its
proponents, to examine the effects of responsive regulation in diverse circumstances and
locales. Research into industry-specific cultures and practices is an important step in
identifying effective regulatory strategies.
5The proportionate distribution of motivational postures is rooted in conditions and
understandings that vary both spatially and temporally. Put differently, industries, regions
and time periods may have considerably different mixes of motivational postures. A host of
economic, sociological, cultural and psychological factors condition the ways typical firms
see and interact with regulatory agencies and personnel. Where the Tax Office is concerned,
this constellation of factors, known as BISEPS (Business; Industry; Sociological; Economic;
Psychological factors), shape the capacity and inclination of firms to comply with tax
requirements. Table 1 lists the significant BISEPS factors for small building and construction
firms.
Table 1: Tax Office – Building and construction BISEPS
The following are taken from 1996 Tax Office statistical data, Australian Bureau of Statistics
figures and the Building and Construction Leaders Workshop held in April 1998. Some of
the following factors may overlap in category but have been placed in one BISEP factor.
Business factors
Key players are professions/suppliers/associations
Core group of contractors/subbies/illegal subbies
Flexible status – easy to become contractor
Low membership in industry associations
Variable record keeping standards
Minimal regulations in some trades
Word of mouth – advertising
Minimal written contracts
Part-time tradesmen
Low set-up costs
Competitive
Status of worker
Number of businesses = 239,475
Individuals – 46.8%
Partnerships – 30.7%
Companies – 16.3%
Trusts – 6.2%
36% have employment variation reviews (EVRs)
59,000 are group employers
98% returns prepared by tax agents
280,000 are salary and wage earners, with an average salary of $26,000
Contributed $41.4b total business income
Paid $816m in tax (2%)
Tax debt approximately $62m
Information technology – $21m, Contracted services – $17m, PPS – $16m
6Industry factors
Cash prevalent in some areas/consumer attitude
Recognised hourly rates/metre rate
Variable skill levels and supply
Varying licensing requirements
Flexible working patterns
Low profit margins
Government and other regulations
Industry-based training
Location differences
Status of workers
Highly unionised-commercial
Market segments
Pay As You Earn (PAYE) erosion
Used to Prescribed Payments System (PPS)
Credit-based
Barter
Sociological factors
50% = 35 to 54 years
86% of industry are male
Low levels of literacy
10% = Child Support Agency clients (population average = 5%)
Norms – weekends are for cash
Male does labour, wife keeps books
Ethic of looking after each other/Jobs for mates
Not paying tax is ok – generally
Ethic of not ripping each other off
Government is the enemy/red tape/big brother
Cultural: distrust of government
Ignorance of requirements
Manual work/pub mentality
Economic factors
International investment
International crises (for example Asia)
Growth leads to complexities/costs
Currently in growth after long depression
Population growth/migration
Inflation and interest rates
Peaks and troughs
Economic uncertainty
Weather
Home ownership/Australian culture/affordability
PPS system not effective
Regional/patchy activity
All governments – policies, laws, reforms, costs, etc.
Unemployment and sickness benefits (USB) and cash
Industrial disputes
7Psychological factors
Fear of the Tax Office
Greed
Attitude – the challenge/game/gamble
Folk hero/Ned Kelly if you cheat
Peer pressure apprentices up
How government spends
They are victims
Paperwork overload
Cash jobs
‘I’m in charge’
Level playing field/fairness
The use of BISEPS materials enables Tax Office and other regulatory agencies to make use
of industry-specific information that might require a particular strategy. It also strengthens
awareness of both current and future challenges and enables forward planning to meet the
needs of both the industry and the Tax Office. The Building and Construction BISEPS in
Table 1 outline aspects of the Australian small building and construction industry circa 1998.
There is little reason to believe matters have changed significantly since then.
Life in the small building and construction industry is filled with uncertainties, although the
participants are a fairly casual lot who are prepared to take risks but are also content to
remain as small businesses. This is an industry dominated by males with low literacy levels
and variable skill levels, many of whom come from non-English speaking backgrounds.
Distrust of government and fear of the Tax Office are common. Generally it is considered
OK to not pay tax, and peer pressure contributes to many taking the risk of cheating on their
taxes. Business relationships are characterised by informality; written contracts are eschewed,
and a great deal of advertising is by word of mouth. Trade regulation is minimal and
licensing requirements vary. These are independent people who like to manage their own
show. Nearly half of these business owners are sole traders, and nearly a third are in
partnership, commonly with their wife. The overwhelming majority of them use the services
of tax agents, but few maintain ongoing relationships with their tax agent throughout the
year. The business records are maintained by the wives. This industry is often faced with
economic uncertainty and pressures from international competition, inflation and interest
rates, and the weather. Barter is common, as is the use of cash. The industry norm is that
8weekend work is paid for in cash that is not declared as income. The industry ethic is very
much one of looking after each other, and the high level of union membership illustrates this.
There is a strong belief in the ‘level playing field’, meaning that everyone in the industry
should have an equal chance to make a living. This description illustrates the competitive but
close relationships in this industry. It also highlights the need for different ways of
communicating with the small building and construction industry rather than the ‘usual’ habit
of government agencies to communicate by form letters couched in the language of petty
officialdom.
The ATO Compliance Model
Adoption of a strategy of responsive regulation by Tax Office executives was the culmination
of nearly two years work by a Cash Economy Task Force. Formed in 1996 and comprising
representatives from industry, community groups and government, the Task Force worked in
partnership with the Tax Office to develop an understanding of the cash economy and
potential responses to it. The Task Force issued its initial report in 1997, which was followed
by a series of Tax Office initiatives aimed at cash transactions among small businesses in
building and construction, restaurants and cafes, fruit and vegetables, clothing and taxis.
Regional projects were aimed at other industries, including fishing, computing and road
transport. By 1998 more than 900 Tax Office employees were assigned to cash economy
projects.
In April 1998 the Commissioner of Taxation publicly released a second Cash Economy Task
Force report. It featured the ATO Compliance Model and its principles, together with
suggestions on ways the Tax Office could tackle the cash economy. The Commissioner also
announced that the CE/B&C project would begin using the principles of the ATO
Compliance Model. Adoption of the ATO Compliance Model set a new direction for the Tax
Office, as well as expectations of how it would shape and manage the tax system. Eventually,
more than 3000 Tax Office staff were trained in the ATO Compliance Model, and it was
implemented in a range of initiatives. Before the number of personnel assigned to the
CE/B&C project was reduced in 1999, some 200 Tax Office personnel were assigned to it.
9Organised in teams of 10 to 15, they were located in major metropolitan areas throughout
Australia. A graphic depiction of the ATO Compliance Model is presented in Figure 2.1
Figure 2: The ATO Compliance Model.
Every approach to regulation features a somewhat distinctive technology. Audits are a key
component of command-and-control tax regulation. The audit process highlights the
importance of monitoring individuals and business entities in order to uncover violations of
law. Accusation and confrontation are unavoidable by-products of this technology. Audits
can require months to complete. Those found to be non-compliant are assessed penalties
which presumably serve to remind them and others that compliance is the best way to go. Not
surprisingly, agencies operating in this fashion are frequently seen as high-handed
adversaries by citizens subject to their programs (Braithwaite, Walker & Grabosky, 1987).
Historically, the Tax Office operated this way, generating large numbers of prosecutions, the
bulk of which were directed at taxpayers of modest means (Grabosky & Braithwaite, 1986).
                                                
1 Several months before it adopted the ATO Compliance Model, the Tax Office issued a Taxpayers’ Charter
(Australian Taxation Office, 1997). Seen as a covenant with taxpayers, it spells out their rights and obligations,
and the options available to them should they be dissatisfied with their treatment by the Tax Office.
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Adoption of the ATO Compliance Model caused the Tax Office to develop and train its staff
in a technology of compliance that contrasts in several ways from the one they used
previously. Whilst maintaining audits as part of the compliance assurance arsenal, the ATO
Compliance Model, as developed by the Tax Office, features a technology designated ‘real
time reviews’. The objectives here are more ambitious than a search for violations and
assessment of penalties. Whereas audits typically require detailed examination of a firm’s
records over a period of months or even years, real time reviews are generally limited to
examining business records and activities for the preceding three months. They require less
time than traditional audits. Real time reviews have a strong educative focus: they are
employed not only to uncover evidence of non-compliance but also to increase understanding
of proper bookkeeping practices and how to increase future compliance. Taxpayers are
treated according to their individual circumstances and, where significant discrepancies are
identified, they are advised and invited to review and amend their previous tax returns. The
focus is on the probability of future compliance. Real time reviews also allow Tax Office
field officers to refer cases for audit or prosecution when wilful or egregious non-compliance
is detected. The use of real time reviews allows field staff to achieve greater coverage and
visibility in the business community. It also enables Tax Office personnel to garner
intelligence about specific industries (Australian Taxation Office, 1999b; 1999c). One
measure of the Tax Office’s commitment to the new technology is that 7515 real time
reviews were conducted for a two-year period from 1998 to 1999 (Cash Economy Project,
1999, p. 3).
Objectives
Reformers cannot assume their intentions and plans will meet with committed and faithful
implementation. Bureaucracies charged with implementing reform policies can show a highly
varied capacity for the job at hand:
Policy ideas that sound great in theory often fail under conditions of actual
field implementation. The implementation process has a life of its own. It is
acted out through large and inflexible administrative systems and is distorted
by bureaucratic interests. Policies that emerge in practice can diverge, even
substantially, from policies as designed and adopted (Bardach, 2000, p. 25).
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Doubtless it was recognition of this that led the Cash Economy Task Force to emphasise as
constraints on the implementation and impact of reform ‘attributes of the tax regime and
administration’. These include not only tax legislation but also ‘its administration, and Tax
Office cultural factors’ (Cash Economy Task Force, 1997, p. 6).
Clearly, organisations vary in their capacity for effective implementation of specific reform
policies and programs. Assuming sufficient understanding, commitment and organisational
resources, there is reason for optimism. If one or more of these conditions is absent, it is
doubtful a new policy can be instituted without serious departures from the vision of the
reformers. This includes routine procedures for monitoring the short-term consequences of
reforms as another component of organisational capacity.
All organisations are constrained by a variety of characteristics and conditions that affect
their capacity to adopt and implement reform initiatives. Some are environmental, others are
matters of staff and organisation, and still others are grounded in the kind of reception
reforms receive from affected constituencies. This research examines the reception given the
ATO Compliance Model by its front-line personnel. Is there evidence to suggest that,
whatever their initial response to the ATO Compliance Model, they moved in the direction of
increased understanding and support for its principles and procedures? A secondary objective
of the research is to explore business awareness of and opinions about the Tax Office’s
changed operating procedures.
Assumptions
Following the Tax Office decision to scale back the CE/B&C project and our decision to
terminate research earlier than originally planned, data analysis was guided by four
assumptions about the kinds of short-term changes one should reasonably expect if the Tax
Office possessed or acquired appropriate and sufficient capacity to implement the ATO
Compliance Model successfully. First, there should be evidence that senior leadership of the
Tax Office supports and invests in the reform policy. Without this condition, there is little
reason to believe that mid-level managers, their field-level counterparts and front-line staff
will take its prescriptions seriously, and change their behaviour accordingly. There should be
evidence, moreover, that leadership has planned for and put in place from the outset
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mechanisms for monitoring early implementation and subsequent evaluation of the initiative.
Doing so ensures the intelligence needed to assess progress or the lack of it, and to make
short-term corrections to the implementation process.
Second, the policy, as defined and presented to supervisors and front-line personnel, should
neither conflict nor be cognitively incongruent with their current perspectives and practices.
Third, there should be evidence that as they are trained and acquire experience with the new
policy, they move in the direction of increased understanding and support for it.
Finally, the context and times should be conducive to or permissive of reform. Whilst
probably few reforms are undertaken in placid times, typically there seems little reason for
change in these circumstances - a calm environment lends itself to the deliberate and self-
reflective decision-making that can nurture and sustain through the precarious early days. By
contrast, reforms undertaken in times of turbulence and tension may not permit personnel to
focus on the job at hand or to reflect upon and make use of evaluations. Times of turmoil do
not permit calm, deliberative decision-making.
Because the ATO Compliance Model posits complex and slow-developing long-term
relationships between the behaviour of enforcement officials and the responses of taxpayers,
it was recognised at the outset that an adequate evaluation of the CE/B&C project would
require collection of data over several years. Unfortunately, the short follow-up period
available to those charged with examining the impact of the ATO Compliance Model permits
confident conclusions about few if any consequences of its adoption and use for nearly two
years. Our examination of the impact of the CE/B&C project, by contrast, is short-term and
based on samples of limited or dubious generalisability. The limitations of the samples and
methodologies further reduce the level of confidence in the findings.
Method
Our research commenced some 18 months after the ATO Compliance Model was adopted by
the Tax Office leadership and was added to ongoing initiatives aimed at the cash economy.
We planned to collect a variety of data on the Tax Office’s implementation of the ATO
Compliance Model, as well as evidence of some of its short-term impacts. We assumed that
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by using a variety of methods and collecting a variety of data, findings gained from multiple
methods or sources would compensate to some extent for their individual shortcomings. We
were only partially successful, however, principally because data collection was terminated
prematurely when cash economy personnel were shifted to work on the GST. This
necessitated a change in plans, and our analytic focus now shifted to examining the capacity
of the Tax Office to successfully implement the ATO Compliance Model.
Data were collected over a 10-month period (August 1999 through May 2000). We began
with interviews during August 1999 with 15 Tax Office managers or employees – some face-
to-face interviews and others by long-distance telephone. These conversations, averaging
approximately 25 minutes, helped familiarise the senior author with the Tax Office and
provided an opportunity to talk with several managers who played important roles in the
field-level implementation process. This was followed in November–December 1999 by
visits to five Tax Office offices where significant CE/B&C project initiatives were in
operation (Sydney CBD, Parramatta, Penrith, Box Hill and Dandenong). We interviewed 26
field-level managers and operatives about their experiences with and opinions about the ATO
Compliance Model in the building and construction industry. The semi-structured interviews
followed a topical guide and averaged approximately 35 minutes each. All were tape-
recorded and transcribed for subsequent analysis.
Following these interviews, in May–August 2000 a survey instrument was emailed to all Tax
Office personnel who at any time were assigned to the CE/B&C project. After two follow-up
reminders to the 260 persons who were sent surveys, 32% returned surveys to us. This low
response rate leaves us unable to assume confidently that those who returned surveys
represent all involved in the CE/B&C project.2
                                                
2 Although we can only speculate as to the reasons for the low response rate, the timing of the survey was
unfortunate: by the time it was mailed to Tax Office staff, the CE/B&C project had been scaled back
substantially. The ATO Compliance Model was no longer a salient issue or focus of work routines, and many
Tax Office staff may have stopped caring about their experiences using it. In addition, the volume of email
field-level staff receive daily is both sizeable and increasing, and this may make it easy to overlook or ignore
messages that clearly do not require a response.
The average age of the 84 survey respondents was 42.6 years, and the average length of time they were assigned
to the CE/B&C project was 22.6 months. Women comprise 21% of the respondents. When asked if they had
worked as a supervisor at any time during the project, 34.6% of respondents answered affirmatively.
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During May–June 2000 we interviewed the owners of 27 small building and construction
firms in Melbourne and Adelaide. The semi-structured interviews, which were tape-recorded
for subsequent transcription and analysis, averaged approximately 30 minutes and explored
respondents’ experiences with and beliefs about the Tax Office and its operations. They were
focused primarily on respondents’ contacts with the Tax Office in the years immediately
before and after introduction of the ATO Compliance Model in 1997.
A variety of difficulties left us unable to follow through with original plans to interview equal
numbers of firms/owners who had varying degrees of contact with the Tax Office in the
preceding two years. Among them, we were unsuccessful in obtaining telephone numbers for
many firms listed in Tax Office files, and a substantial majority of those we did contact
declined our request for an interview. We estimate that not more than 5% of all firms
contacted agreed to and completed an interview. As a result, the sample of businesses almost
certainly is tilted toward those who comply with tax requirements and have no particular
reason, therefore, to be wary of sharing their experiences with and opinions of the Tax
Office. Thus we almost certainly interviewed a sample of firms whose owners had good
records of voluntary compliance with tax laws. As one of our subjects told us: ‘I think if a
company is fair dinkum and up-front, they shouldn’t be worried about the Tax Office, you
know. If you’re doing the right thing you’ve got nothing to worry about.’ In the language and
logic of the ATO Compliance Model, as presented in Figure 2, these firms and their owners
are located near the bottom of the pyramid. Our findings are therefore limited to the
population they represent.
In addition to interviews with Tax Office personnel and the owners of small building and
construction firms, we also interviewed an executive of the Department of Public
Prosecutions and a representative of the Master Builders Association of Victoria. These
interviews were also tape-recorded.
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Findings
To what extent were our assumptions about organisational capacity for change matched by
conditions in the CE/B&C project during the first few years of its operation? Did it have or
acquire the resources to suggest that over a longer period the expected results of responsive
regulation would be realised?
Leadership and staff
Few presumably would dispute the assumption that a creative and committed staff in
sufficient numbers is critical to an organisation’s capacity to faithfully implement reform
policies. Ample evidence suggests that senior Tax Office managers gave strong and ongoing
support. This support came from the highest levels of the Tax Office, particularly from the
Commissioner, the Deputy Commissioner of the Small Business area, the Assistant
Commissioner responsible for managing the cash economy initiative, and the Project Leader
for Building and Construction. They sponsored and provided resources for training in the
ATO Compliance Model for all staff on the CE/B&C project, and they visited and provided
encouragement. When the initial training program was begun, senior Tax Office managers
signalled their support by attending and participating in the training course. They discussed
the direction in which the Tax Office was moving and how the ATO Compliance Model
complemented it. They emphasised that Tax Office practices and procedures were important
issues in building and maintaining community confidence in the Tax Office and its ability to
administer the tax system. None of the personnel we interviewed faulted Tax Office
executives for failure to support or to provide sufficient resources for the CE/B&C project.
Approximately 35% of our survey respondents indicated that at some time they were
responsible for supervising other Tax Office personnel as part of the CE/B&C project. They
ranged from team leaders to mid-level managers. All survey respondents were asked to
indicate their agreement or disagreement with the statement: ‘The leadership of the
Australian Taxation Office failed to devote sufficient resources to implementation of the
compliance model’. For supervisors, 33.3% of respondents agreed or agreed strongly whilst
40.7% disagreed or disagreed strongly. For respondents who were not supervisors, the results
are 34.6% and 36.5% respectively. These findings are consistent with the interview data:
neither supervisors nor operatives perceive a failure by Tax Office executives to provide
adequate fiscal resources and personnel for the CE/B&C project.
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In this and in other ways, support for the ATO Compliance Model by Tax Office executives
was not lost on field-level staff. When asked for his opinion about the ATO Compliance
Model, one Tax Office operative spoke with apparent conviction about the importance of
treating taxpayers with ‘understanding’, ‘respect’ and ‘compassion’. As the interview
progressed, however, and he was asked to reconcile seemingly contradictory statements, he
said that his earlier comments reflected a belief that Tax Office executives are committed to
the ATO Compliance Model, that they expect field-level staff to get on board, and that they
would be watchful for signs of weak commitment and follow through.
This is not to say the ATO Compliance Model was welcomed by all or even by most staff.
Some saw it as a hopelessly abstract approach developed by academics and then adopted by
Tax Office executives:
Let’s face it: the compliance model was an academic model adapted to the tax
situation. It was developed by … I think, people outside of [ATO]. ATO saw
it as the way we should be moving ... and I’m not disagreeing. I think they’re
right. But it was done at the more senior level by people who are inclined that
way [toward consultative approaches] anyway.
For most field-level personnel of the Tax Office, adoption of the ATO Compliance Model for
the small building and construction industry apparently came out of the blue.3 For those we
interviewed, there was limited awareness of how the decision was made, combined with
some disappointment and cynicism:
I’m an employee of the Taxation Office, and this is an instruction that’s put to
me. I’ve no input into its adoption whatsoever. I’m not asked whether, you
know, this is a good idea. Should we go this way, or whatever? You’re an
experienced taxation officer. You’ve been in this place for [more than 25]
years, what have you found in that period of time about, you know,
compliance in taxation?
This was imposed ... certainly. No two ways about it. We were given two days
to provide feedback ... It was like, okay, ‘we’ve made a decision, but we
should get something from the people in the office to make them think that
they’re having some feedback into it’. [W]e didn’t feel we were part of it at all
                                                
3 Some may see irony in the fact that the ATO Compliance Model, which highlights the importance of and the
pay-off from consultation, education and cooperative relationships, was adopted and implemented in a top-
down, command-and-control fashion within the Tax Office.
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... [T]he decision was made before we even were given a chance to offer
feedback. I think they ended up – so many people complained – they gave us
another week to give feedback, but it was still basically we felt that they just
threw it away or put it in a corner and basically came out with the model they
wanted.
For these reasons, perhaps, a mid-level manager who helped implement the ATO Compliance
Model told us that:
It wasn’t universally welcomed in the Tax Office, or in the [CE/B&C] project
anyway, which is probably representative of the Tax Office. I think the
majority of people in the Tax Office thought straight off ‘oh, yeah, now we’re
going soft on everyone’, you know. I think that was the quick interpretation of
it, that ‘oh, now we just pat them on the head and tell them to be good in the
future and walk away’, you know.
The respondent noted further that apparently little thought was given to ‘the ability of people’
(staff) to shift to the new approach. The respondent added: ‘I think it’s a huge jump for
some’.
Whatever their initial reactions, however, successful implementation of a reform is enhanced
if staff take on as their own its fundamental assumptions. Consequently, in our survey we
asked current and former CE/B&C project personnel to comment retrospectively on their
expectations about the ATO Compliance Model at introduction and after they gained
experience using it. Responses to this series of questions suggest that the subjects fall into
three groups. At introduction, 9.8% said they were very sceptical about the ATO Compliance
Model whilst 4.7% were equally enthusiastic about it. The remaining 85.6% of respondents
ranged from somewhat sceptical to somewhat enthusiastic. Although few of those who held
strong opinions about the ATO Compliance Model at introduction changed their assessment
with experience, for those with less extreme opinions a majority (54.1%) became more
positive about it. Our interview data are consistent with this pattern.
Q: So, you have had two years experience now with the compliance model?
A: Yes.
Q: And what’s your assessment of it now?
A: I like it. I like it. It has a greater impact, because previously you were only
dealing, you know, [one-on-one] and had no impact on the industry ... But
now, bringing in the various associations and what have you and getting the
publicity, it has a wider impact. So it is more one-to-many, which I like. A lot
more flexibility, a lot more choice, which I like.
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[O]riginally ... it was seen as ‘oh, this is going to be Mickey-Mouse type of
activity that they’re going into. When will they get back to doing actual
work?’ And things like that. After a while of going through it, they could see
the advantages of doing some of the alternative type of work as well as the
audit activities. But I think it was only when they could see that there was
room for the two.
One reason for change or the lack of it may lie in the perspectives and practices of front-line
managers. Of all respondents, supervisors were more likely to have been somewhat or very
sceptical at introduction although, like operatives, a majority of them became more
supportive of the ATO Compliance Model as they gained experience with it. Nevertheless,
when compared with operatives, supervisors were also more likely to become sceptical with
the passage of time (18% and 6% respectively).
Their growing support for the ATO Compliance Model does not extend to an unqualified
endorsement of it; staff beliefs about and experience with tax enforcement have left many
ambivalent about the long-term consequences of responsive regulation. On one hand, they
prefer real time reviews to audits. Generally the latter are triggered by suspicion or evidence
that something is amiss with the tax behaviour of a business. The resulting detailed
examination of financial records can be both adversarial and confrontational. They can be
difficult both for operatives and for the targets of their efforts. Several Tax Office operatives
we interviewed commented spontaneously on their dislike for the audit process, which puts a
premium on being able to act assertively. For example:
While I was an auditor I hated it. When I was doing my degree I always
wanted to be an auditor, and it’s like, you know, you get there and you think,
‘this is horrible’. So I didn’t like it. I didn’t like the aggression that came
along with auditing. It was more than assertive, it was probably aggressive ...
And it was like, let’s see what we can get, how we can intimidate this person,
that sort of thing ... So I really learned to hate it a lot. When the Building and
Construction Project came along, and we saw the methodology was real time
reviews, we didn’t know what it meant. But when we saw that it was a lot
softer than an audit, a lot faster, and less intimidatory, and probably more
helpful, I liked it. I preferred that way of doing things.
On the other hand, former CE/B&C project staff members tend to be rather cynical about the
sources of tax compliance. Asked, for example, whether ‘fear of penalties is more important
than conscience and the obligations of citizenship’ as reasons for tax compliance, 71.8% of
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our survey respondents agreed or agreed strongly. Clearly, they believe that a strong threat is
fundamental to the compliance assurance process. Not surprising, therefore, one of their most
frequently mentioned concerns was whether the Tax Office would maintain the level of
prosecutions needed to make it work. They wonder whether the ‘benign big gun’ will be
employed sufficiently often to maintain an acceptable level of tax compliance.
The technology of compliance does not end with real time reviews; responsive regulation
highlights the importance of involving community and industry groups in efforts to maintain
or improve overall tax compliance. This means that Tax Office staff are now expected to also
contact and work with these stakeholders to improve awareness of and support for the tax
system. This requires work routines and personal skills different from those used in audits
and penalties, the traditional mainstays of tax enforcement. Early on in the CE/B&C project,
the project leader visited the senior management of the Master Builders Association and the
Housing Industry Association in Canberra. He explained that the project would be using the
principles of the ATO Compliance Model, and outlined the benefits its use would bring to the
Tax Office and to the building and construction industry. Similar meetings were held with the
management of comparable associations around Australia. The new efforts bore fruit. The
Master Builders Association announced its support for the work the Tax Office was doing in
the industry and its willingness to work with the Tax Office to ensure cash economy practices
were ended (Australian Taxation Office, 1999a). It is premature to examine the effects of
these complex and indirect effects of responsive regulation, but field-level Tax Office
personnel who responded to our survey were notably positive in their assessments of how
well this process proceeded and the pay-offs from it. Specifically, they were asked to indicate
their degree of agreement or disagreement with the statement: ‘During the time I worked in
the Cash Economy Building and Construction project, I witnessed substantially improved
trust and cooperation between trade associations and the Australian Taxation Office’. A
majority of respondents (51%) agreed or agreed strongly.
Whilst the broad principles of the ATO Compliance Model are endorsed by our subjects, this
begs the question whether their increasing support for it in the abstract reflects detailed
understanding of its principles and whether they in fact changed their work routines
accordingly. Concern about these matters is heightened by comments we repeatedly heard to
wit: it is ‘just common sense’ or ‘it’s what we’ve been doing all along’. This suggests that the
20
more arcane aspects of the ATO Compliance Model may have been missed by a substantial
proportion of those assigned to the CE/B&C project. A team leader told us:
[I]t’s really interesting. When we did our one-to-one session, and even
afterwards, one of my team members said to me [that] he wished he knew
about this compliance model previously. Because it’s not just a tool you can
use in your work environment, it’s a tool you can use in real life, you know, in
your relationships with other people. I mean you give people a chance before
you go heavy with them. It’s what we’ve always done but all you’ve done
now is put a name to it. You call it a compliance model. It’s what we always
used to do.
The subject now acknowledged that his earlier characterisation of the model masked
considerable doubt and uncertainty about it.4
Context and timing
We noted that favourable environmental conditions can play a critical part in an
organisation’s capacity to change policy directions and to construct viable new structures and
practices. Use of the ATO Compliance Model was added to an ongoing series of Tax Office
initiatives begun in 1997 that were aimed at increasing citizen trust and reducing cash
transactions in several industries. These initiatives came in the midst of what seemed to some
of those we interviewed as a period of torrential changes, nearly all of which necessitated
change in work routines and skills. To this was added later the inexorable approach of the
GST. By mid-1999, when we interviewed Tax Office operatives, expressions of anxiety and
fear of being overwhelmed were commonplace. For example:
Our workload has increased. Our responsibilities have increased ... The
knowledge that you require to do your job properly is increasing ... The
biggest change in the Tax Office I’ve seen [however] is because of
technology, not because of the compliance model ... I’m not the best person
when it comes to technology. It’s going too fast for me ... and I’m more
reluctant to change ... Now we’ve got the new tax system, and it is coming on
top of everything else. And I just don’t want to know about it yet. I really
don’t. I don’t want to know anything about GST.
                                                
4 In 30 years research, the senior author has rarely encountered the level of unease and anxiety expressed in
interviews with Tax Office field-level personnel. Whether this results from unfamiliarity with academic
investigators or from the pace of change in their workday, many of those we interviewed seemed unusually
jittery.
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The subject is not alone in his perceptions and anxiety. Responding to twin imperatives of the
push for improved efficiency provided by rapid technological change and new tax policy, the
result is a marked increase in workload and efficiency by Tax Office personnel
(Commissioner of Taxation, 2000, pp. 13–14). Along with outsourcing of work formerly
carried out by government employees, hotelling or ‘hot desking’ has changed forever the
nature of operatives’ work and their interaction with supervisors and headquarters; a great
deal of this now takes place electronically. For many front-line employees, one of the
principal consequences is a sense of mistrust and anxiety, to which the rapid approach of the
GST was a major contributor.
Evaluation
The Tax Office evaluated its cash economy projects and reported evidence that things are
working (Australian Taxation Office, 1999a). Evidence of two kinds is cited in support of
this conclusion: gains in income and reported taxes by building and construction firms, and
the results of an ongoing series of surveys in which citizens are asked their perceptions of the
Tax Office and its operations (Commissioner of Taxation, 2000, pp. 35–6). Both are
reasonable and appropriate measures of program impact: the former because use of the ATO
Compliance Model clearly is meant to increase taxpaying, and the latter because the new Tax
Office in time should be seen by citizens as a more helpful and less threatening arm of
government.
No data or evidence used or cited to this point as evidence of success can stand cursory
methodological scrutiny, however. Although reported income is up, this increase must be
seen against the backdrop of economic improvement and the upward trend in tax revenues.
‘For most of the past decade, total and company tax collections have grown at a rate greater
than GDP’ (Commissioner of Taxation, 2000, p. 9). Since December 1996 the Tax Office has
conducted biannual surveys to measure community perceptions of the organisation. Whilst
citizen perceptions of some aspects of Tax Office operations have improved modestly over
the past three years, ‘the results to date have remained fairly constant’ (Commissioner of
Taxation, 2000, p. 49). Studies of samples drawn from the building and construction industry
have been more promising, but failure to examine the possible influence of other factors
limits confidence in these findings. The short period of time (three years) is not sufficient to
warrant more than cautious optimism.
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Business owners and the ‘New Tax Office’
Underlying our interviews with the owners of small building and construction firms is the
assumption that if the ATO Compliance Model is on the right track, there should be evidence
that the word is getting out to those at whom the policy is aimed and evidence also that they
are changing their perspectives. Specifically, we reasoned that if any short-term impacts of
the CE/B&C project were to be apparent after less than two years duration, it should be
present in the experiences and opinions of business owners who had direct contact with the
Tax Office during this time.
Before examining this issue, it is noteworthy that very few of those we interviewed expressed
opinions of unfairness about the tax system generally. One respondent, however, told us:
[T]he thing that you’ll find in the building industry is that they are particularly
hostile to the Taxation Department because they sit there and they watch
multinational companies paying no bloody tax at all [whilst] they are being
screwed into the ground. That’s where the hostility comes from. That’s where
a lot of the cash economy comes from, because there ... is resentment ... The
rates are too high, [and] multinationals will not pay their taxes. And not only
multinationals, there are others too. But generally the wealthy don’t pay their
bloody taxes, and that’s where the resentment comes from.
Q: What ... could the Tax Office do to soften this perception of unfairness in
the taxation system?
A: Charge multinational companies exactly the same rate of tax that we pay,
and don’t let them write off losses that everybody knows are fake. Everybody
knows that these losses are paper losses. The money’s being shipped out
overseas. We know that, the Government knows that ... But they never touch
them. It is time – all over the world – if the multinationals could be pulled into
line because if they pay their share, everyone else will have to – we’ll all of a
sudden find that everything’s down to a reasonable rate. I mean, these people
deal in billions of dollars not in, you know, $50,000 a year or something like.
They deal in billions of dollars.
Q: So you think the tax system generally is simply unfair?
A: It’s grossly unfair. The rich pay nothing.
Q: Grossly unfair?
A: Grossly unfair. It’s to the point of nearly being highway robbery. The
middle and lower income earners are paying for everything. The rich at the top
they don’t. They write it off on schemes. They can afford fancy accountants
and all the rest of it. The rest of us can’t ... It’s ridiculous.
This subject was virtually alone in his charge that the tax system is distributively unfair.
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Most business owners were less critical of the tax system overall and directed their criticism
at the Tax Office specifically. They were mistrustful and cynical about it and its policies. A
substantial proportion believe that little good and potentially a great deal of trouble and lost
production time can come from contacts with the Tax Office. One remarked:
Q: How often does ATO come up – I realise these are unusual times because
of GST coming in, right – but if you can go back to six months ago, before
everyone started to worry about GST, how often does ATO come up in
conversation on the job?
A: Hardly ever ...
Q: When it does come up, what is the general tenor of comments about the
ATO?
A: Fear ... Probably it’s the fear of the unknown, you know. We all reckon that
public servants are arrogant pricks anyway that really don’t know what they’re
doing, and the only reason they’re there is because they couldn’t make it in the
real world ... That’s the sort of attitude because when – if you talk to anybody
that’s met them, that’s how they come over. It’s like a policeman standing
there ... and everybody fears a policeman, don’t they? Doesn’t matter whether
you’re not doing anything or whether you were, you know ... [Y]ou think,
‘what have I done wrong?’ And you get the same sort of thing when they
mention the ATO or the Tax Department. ‘What in the hell have I done wrong
now?’ And that’s the reason – they’re not there to help you, they’re there to
nail you.
Another and unusually clear representation of this was given by a plumber who was
interviewed, along with his business partner and mate on their job site:
I mean, it’s all too hard: that something that should be so simple is made so
hard. On top of going to work and making a living, we’re expected to work all
our tax out and everything else out, and it’s that bloody complicated.
Chartered accountants can’t work it out who are trained to do that. And yet
they want us to do it. I mean, like, how many of those guys can come and put
up gutters and dig trenches and lay plumbing? Fucking none of them! But they
expect us to be able to do – to keep our books in – in absolute perfect order.
The Tax Office is very inflexible when it comes to listening to any reasons
why – it’s not like dealing with anybody else. I mean, it’s basically, ‘You
were due to pay that on the 21st.’ And this one young lady ... I spoke to her
and I said, ‘Look, you know, can I have, you know, two weeks [to meet tax
obligations]?’ (And I had never defaulted on my taxes.) She said, ‘No, I’ve got
a record here that you paid late the last two months.’ And I said, ‘Yes, but I
have paid, and I am finding it really hard at the moment.’ She said, ‘No, you
will pay like immediately or I’ll start fining you tomorrow, and you’re going
to get’ – I can’t remember what she said – some sort of record as a problem
payer ... And I thought she was a very hard woman ... So ... yes, I lost it. I
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couldn’t even talk to her. I hung up. Anyway, she rang me back a couple of
days later, and she was a little bit nicer. But ... it had got to the point where
[our business] was really struggling.
Q: What is your impression of how small business owners like yourself
generally see the ATO?
A: How do we see it?
Q: Yes. Does this ever come up in conversation between you and your mates?
A: Not really, no. The consensus is everybody hates it, you know. The Tax
Office is there to rob us of any chance of making any profit for anything, and
that’s it, and I think that’s the consensus with most people.
Another subject commented simply that ‘the public perceives them to be just a bully’.
Wariness and cynicism were not universal, however; a minority of the respondents noted that
the Tax Office merely carries out policies enacted and modified periodically by ‘politicians’
(that is, Parliament). Consequently, a subject told us:
[I]f you need any advice, then who better to go to than the ATO – apart from
your own accountant. [If] there are some little things that you might want to
know ... the ATO will be able to tell you. So it’s best to go there.
One of the principal objectives of the ATO Compliance Model is improved business
perception of the Tax Office and a more cooperative culture among business owners. No one
expects this will be accomplished quickly, but the model rests on an assumption that over the
long haul its use will produce effects of this type. Our interviews focused principally on
subjects’ experiences with and perceptions of the Tax Office over the past five years. Few of
the building and construction owners were aware that the Tax Office had launched the ATO
Compliance Model, but a much larger number reported they had personal contacts with the
Tax Office during this time. One of the most striking characteristics of the responses we
received was the large proportion who spoke positively of the way they were treated in these
contacts.5 A man whose business records were audited by Tax Office staff some 10 years ago
commented on the contrast between that experience and a real time review conducted by the
Tax Office approximately one year before our conversation:
                                                
5 The one building and construction industry representative we interviewed was quite positive in his comments
about responsive regulation as he had experienced it. He was impressed particularly by the willingness of Tax
Office personnel to attend meetings of their organisation, to do presentations as part of the meeting program,
and afterwards to answer questions posed by builders in attendance.
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Q: You mentioned a few minutes ago that, historically, the building and
construction industry is one where – you didn’t say it this way, but I think this
is what you meant – people are suspicious of, a bit wary, of the Australian
Taxation Office?
A: Years ago, yes ... Up until the last few years, you know. I must admit the
first time I ever got audited that they treated me like a common criminal, you
know, until you’re proven innocent. And consequently I had a shocking
attitude to the Taxation Department because I just thought all they were trying
to do is put you out of business ... I must admit I had a shocking attitude
towards them ... But I think that the people that have contact with them now
understand that they’ve got their job to do and that they are trying to be user
friendly as much as possible ... I must admit, my attitude’s been changed
completely.
As impressive as these comments are, they and others like them are subject to a host of
interpretations other than the tempting one that business owners are changing their
perceptions as a result of the Tax Office’s use of the ATO Compliance Model. The
respondent was asked, for example:
Q: Do you think getting a little bit older also has anything to do with this?
A: Most certainly. Most certainly.
Q: How would you interpret that?
A: I just think that when you’re younger you’re a little bit more gung ho sort
of thing ... but I think as you get older you start to become a little bit wiser and
start to understand, you know, they’ve [ATO] got their job to do and,
consequently, we need to pay taxes to have all the benefits that everybody
needs. You do have that [attitude] ... when you’re young. And that’s when
most companies are starting – they just want to go full on trying to get their
businesses up and running, and if anybody comes in – it doesn’t matter if it’s
the Taxation Department or anybody else – to interrupt what they’re trying to
achieve then they would try to dismiss them ... And I think most people that
run their businesses are inclined that way ... They just don’t like to be pulled
up ... They just want to go for it.
Our cautious interpretation of what we were told, however, should not obscure the fact that
this respondent was not alone in noting that he has seen a change in the Tax Office.
Responding to a question, another business owner commented:
Q: Has this [most recent] contact [with ATO] in any way changed the way you
think about them?
A: Absolutely. Absolutely. Like I said ... it was, first of all it was nice to see
that it was actually a human being that worked for the Tax Office. Because as
far as I always thought, they weren’t humans anyway. Yes, it was nice to have
somebody you could look at and actually speak to, and, yes, he was a nice
guy.
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Q: But when we began talking, you used some of the words that [others] have
used to describe them: ‘rude’, ‘arrogant’...
A: That’s right. Yes. And that was from speaking over the phone [with them].
And ... when I had this meeting with them some time ago, that was exactly the
way that I’d always thought of them. Especially from that initial time [several
years previously]. Yes, my perception definitely changed after having this guy
here a couple of weeks ago. Like I said, he was nice, he was understanding.
He explained, you know, what we wanted to know ... It was good to be one on
one and see one of these guys.
It is well to recall again that the sample of firm owners we interviewed was made up almost
entirely of those with a record of compliance. This should temper our readiness to interpret
these findings as indicative of success for the ATO Compliance Model. They are strongly
suggestive, however.
Lessons
Our research began with two overarching questions: (1) to what extent did the Tax Office
have or acquire during the initial two years of operation of its CE/B&E project capacity to
implement the ATO Compliance Model with a reasonable chance of success, and (2) what
can be learned from the CE/B&C project initiative that could be useful now that the ATO
Compliance Model has been extended throughout the Tax Office?
Regarding the former, there is strong evidence that Tax Office executives supported the ATO
Compliance Model and provided adequate resources for its trial implementation. There is
evidence also, albeit considerably weaker, that field-level staff gradually warmed to the
approach although they continue to harbour ambivalence about it and reservations about its
long-term impact. The ATO Compliance Model was adopted by the Tax Office during a time
of considerable external change and uncertainty, and it can be extremely difficult to isolate
and determine the effects of new policies under such conditions. The Tax Office was
powerless to maintain an environment in which the CE/B&C project could function smoothly
and reflectively. The problems, however, are not confined to the absence of stable
environmental conditions; the ATO Compliance Model was adopted at a time of change and
uncertainty within the Tax Office as well. Management initiatives to increase employee
productivity, coupled with changes in employee work routines, contributed to pervasive
uncertainty and stress.
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For reasons presumably diverse and complex, some conditions important for achievement of
reform initiatives did not materialise. Plans for evaluating the CE/B&C project were not built
in and were hampered by shortcomings in routine data collection and management
capabilities. The Tax Office’s Case Management Reports and Analysis system is a case in
point. This system was designed for reporting in the area of withholding tax, and only later
was modified for use in other tax areas. The modifications, however, were stopgap in nature,
and the finished product was unsatisfactory. When applied to the CE/B&C project, the
resulting system of data and case management was of limited use both for Tax Office
personnel and for those who would use it to examine the implementation and effectiveness of
the ATO Compliance Model. It proved unreliable as a guide for drawing our sample of firms
with variable intensity of contact with the Tax Office during the preceding two years, and
even efforts to determine how many real time reviews were conducted during the same
period yielded inconsistent numbers. Despite indications of considerable organisational
capacity for responsive regulation, the Tax Office probably will not know with any degree of
confidence how well the program operated.
What lessons can be drawn from the CE/B&C project that may be of value now that the Tax
Office has extended the ATO Compliance Model to all areas of compliance assurance?
Clearly, new policies and procedures for evaluating them should be launched at one and the
same time. This was not done when the Tax Office moved to responsive regulation of the
small building and construction industry. One possible consequence of this is limited gain in
knowledge of how to implement new policies and make them work soundly. An interview
subject told us:
I think the biggest problem in the office is that we always go – we don’t have
balance. We go all or nothing. So, we go compliance model ... ‘This is the be
all and the end all, and it’s happening today, and everybody will live and
breathe it.’ And that was the message that was put out: ‘You will live the
compliance model’ ... It should be – and I am not sure how to achieve it – a
more subtle thing; it should be built, and it shouldn’t just be bang, thrown on
the table and ‘here, take it away. This is what you have got to do.’ We do a lot
of things that way. The office seems to always work that way; if it is going to
start something it doesn’t pilot it, it doesn’t test it, it goes for it.
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Although this subject may be unaware of it, his comments on the importance of testing new
programs carefully and rigorously are disputed by few policy analysts. Not only should they
be tested, but procedures for doing so and a clear understanding of the specific kinds of data
to be collected should be built into the program from the outset. Decisions about the kinds of
evidence that will be taken as a sign of success or failure should be reflected in routine record
keeping. Whether or not the turbulent environmental conditions in which the Tax Office has
operated in recent years and its own unsettled internal worlds would have made possible
anything more than was done is unknown, but Tax Office evaluation studies and the results
of this research are cause for modest optimism.
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